



Ranked Candidate Fairness in Preference Aggregation




Preference Aggregation Domains & Applications

Social Choice & Information Retrieval.



Fair Preference Aggregation



1. Unbiased (fair) decisions for ranked candidates
2. Represent voter preferences as much as possible

Intersectional Fair Preference Aggregation [1]

Pairwise fair ranking metrics for multi-group attributes and intersectional groups.


MANI-RANK problem - Multi-attribute and intersectional fair consensus rankings.

Design PFair-Kemeny to solve MANI-RANK.


MANI-RANK fairness:

$$ARP_{p^k}(\pi) \leq \Delta \quad (\forall p^k \in \mathcal{P}) \quad \text{multi-group pairwise fairness}$$

$$IRP(\pi) \leq \Delta \quad \text{intersectional pairwise fairness}$$



Intersectional Fairness only arises when all (attribute & intersectional groups) considered.



References

- [1] Cachel, Kathleen, Elke A. Rundensteiner and Lane Harrison. "MANI-Rank: Multiple Attribute and Intersectional Group Fairness for Consensus Ranking." *IEEE ICDE* (2022).
- [2] Shrestha, Hilson, Kathleen Cachel, Mallak Alkhatlan, Elke A. Rundensteiner and Lane Harrison. "Help or Hinder? Evaluating the Impact of Fairness Metrics and Algorithms in Visualizations for Consensus Ranking." *ACM FAccT* (2023).
- [3] Cachel, Kathleen and Elke A. Rundensteiner. "Fairer Together: Mitigating Disparate Exposure in Kemeny Rank Aggregation." *Proceedings of the 2023 ACM FAccT* (2023).
- [4] Singh, Ashudeep and Thorsten Joachims. "Fairness of Exposure in Rankings." *ACM SIGKDD* (2018).


How can voters make collective decisions over candidates in such a manner that is unbiased (fair) towards marginalized groups of candidates?

CANDIDATES	VOTER1	VOTER2	VOTER3	FAIR CONSENSUS RANKING
Amy	Nick	Nick	Teddy	?
Teddy	Mark	Mark	Mark	?
Joe	Heidi	Amy	Joe	?
Margaret	David	David	David	?
	Heidi	Amy	Nick	?
	Teddy	Teddy	Heidi	?
	Joe	Heidi	Amy	?
	Margaret	Margaret	Margaret	?

Effects of Interactive Fair Preference Aggregation [2]

FairFuse interactive consensus ranking system.

We compare two visualization systems for fair consensus ranking, with task-based evaluation results highlighting the value and challenges of visualizing fairness metrics & algorithms.



Good visualizations can help users navigate complexity.

Visually displaying metrics can lead to an increase credence in and over-reliance of fairness metrics.

Acknowledgements

Thank you to my Dissertation Committee: Elke Rundensteiner, Lane Harrison, Andrew Trapp, and Nick Mattei.

Great WPI Collaborators: Hilson Shrestha and Mallak Alkhatlan.

NSF #2007932

Fair Exposure Preference Aggregation [3]

Introduction of Fair Exposure Kemeny Rank Aggregation.

Fair-Exp KAP: Find ranking r such that

- 1 $Exposure\ Ratio(r) \geq \gamma$


Candidate fairness sensitive to position bias. Using fairness of exposure from Singh et al. [4].

- 2 Maximize $Consensus\ Accuracy(r | prefs)$

Combines and maximizes preference representation. Using Kendall-tau (Kemeny) distance.

Introduce two fairness-tunable methods EPIK (Exposure Parity in Kemeny) & EPIRA (Exposure Parity in Rank Aggregation).

Experimentally find while Kemeny is fair in certain instances only EPIK is always fair.



Methods with alternate fairness goals can introduce unfairness (disparate exposure).


Dataset	Metric	KEMENY	EPIK	EPIRA	PFair-KEM	RAPF	PRE-FE
AGH 2003	consensus accuracy (CA)	0.7536	0.6897	0.6714	0.7456	0.7190	0.7536
	group A avg. exposure	0.4343	0.4796	0.4680	0.4305	0.4329	0.4343
	group B avg. exposure	0.5496	0.4590	0.4821	0.5572	0.5524	0.5496
	exposure ratio (ER)	0.7902	0.9572	0.9707	0.7725	0.7834	0.7902

Paper includes 6 additional datasets.

Work in Progress

How can we combine *incomplete voter preferences* into a suitable consensus mitigating both discriminatory bias in voter rankings and in the selection of who is ranked?

How can we combine voter preferences, expressed as *rankings and ratings of candidates*, into a fair consensus ranking?



Learn More

Email: kcachel@wpi.edu

